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PROLOGUE
Wex S. Malone*
L Allegro
The past few decades have witnessed repeated waves of reform
in the law of torts: New classes of persons have managed to assert
their claims with success, new interests of personality have achieved
recognition, and traditional immunities and defenses have been giving way at a smartish pace. In this era of repentance of past sins it
is to be expected that the doctrine of contributory negligence, that
notorious hanger-on from less enlightened days, should be made to
take its turn before the inquisition. Indeed, renewed insistence that
the old rule of contributory negligence should be relegated to
history is almost certain to meet with a sympathetic response. A
sense of fair play prompts one to retreat from the notion that a
discovery of fault on the part of a tort victim should serve in some
way to work a total forgiveness of the equal or greater fault of the
defendant who injured him. How much more palatable is the suggestion that law should afford some measure of protection for even the
incautious victim, provided only that in expiation for his
carelessness he should be obliged to suffer a trimming down in the
amount of his entitlement. In this way each misbehaving party gets
his comeuppance, yet everybody wins a teddybear. There are practical advantages, too, in the comparative negligence approach.
Claims are easier to compromise, and disputes as to both facts and
law can be reconciled through a little give and take in terms of the
amount of damages to be awarded.
Thus runs the argument for change; and a sympathetic response
now appears to be at hand. The Louisiana legislature has seen fit to
change more than a century of decisional law-a century during
which our courts managed to sidestep the familiar French doctrine
of faute commune and even bypassed an article of our Civil Code
(article 2323) which arguably ordains comparative negligence in express language for this state. The courts adopted instead the common law doctrine of contributory negligence. Moreover, they insisted on retaining it even after several neighboring states with
common law heritage had abandoned it in favor of comparative
negligence.
The broad picture of the reform is well painted by Professor
Wade, and his comments on the new Louisiana measure against the
backdrop of the national scene are thoughtful and instructive.
*Boyd Professor Emeritus of Law, Louisiana State University.
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Il Penseroso
Is this, then, an hour for self-congratulation as our legislature
repudiates the traditional approach to plaintiff fault and embarks
upon the sea of comparative negligence? Or, more soberly, is there
need for a thoughtful pause at the threshold of the adventure? A
precautionary word or two may indeed be well advised while the
new material is still malleable and before embarassing commitments
have been made. Perhaps some of the writers who follow in this
symposium may be inclined to view a bit skeptically the easy
premise that an adjustment of damages in terms of the respective
faults of the parties is a course whose wisdom is beyond question.
A discriminating search for whatever justification underlies
comparative negligence should begin, I suggest, with the concession
that comparative fault can claim no support sturdier than the support that underlies fault itself. To the extent that personal fault fails
as an acceptable means for deciding whether there should be any
liability at all, it must fail even more abjectly as a gauge for
estimating how much liability, in terms of dollars and cents, should
be measured out.
Here at the very outset there is reason for pause. We must face
again an old question: Just why does liability depend on fault? The
answer appears to be that we regard fault as avoidable misbehavior.
In a free-willing world this means that fault is something that can
be corrected by the misbehaving person once he is faced with the
realization that his "wrongful" conduct will prove costly and will
oblige him to pay damages in reparation. Hence the gain which
presumably accrues to society as a result of admonishing the
wrongdoer (and, through him, others who may be tempted to
misbehave) affords the most plausible justification for the fault
system. By the same token, the object of admonishing the victim
who misbehaves himself affords the most plausible justification for
recognizing either contributory negligence or comparative
negligence.
Once we accept the role of fault as it is described above, we
come upon perilously shifting sands; for if the underlying admonitory function upon which the fault system depends ceases to
hold good and there is no longer a lesson to be taught and learned,
the entire structure of fault gives way (and with it, of course, both
contributory and comparative negligence).
Yet this breaking down of fault as an admonitory expedient appears to be what has been happening and is continuing to happen.
Negligence, as a concept in practical legal usage, is endowed with
little ethical content in the sense that it describes behavior that can
be avoided in the future through the self-discipline of an enlightened
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sinner. As employed in the courtroom, negligence is little more than
a professional word of art. It is readily discoverable, for example,
whenever there is an inadvertent violation of some petty administrative ordinance. At its best, the negligence formula with its
"reasonable man" rationale assists in striking a balance between
social and economic factors which are largely impersonal in their
character. It is a wholly objective standard, and a charge of
carelessness cannot be avoided by attempting to do one's level best.
Certainly it serves as a poor guide for future behavior.
But even if the above observations are wrong, and negligence
does fairly describe conduct that is correctable through the exertion
of effort by any properly motivated actor, it is nevertheless hard to
deny that under modern conditions there remains little urge to attempt an improvement of one's behavior in order to avoid the
unpleasant prospect of being mulct in damages. The extensive
resort to liability insurance, which is prevalent today, has changed
all this, except as insurance rating practices may tend to reflect a
favorable accident experience of the insured. For our purpose it is
significant that the area in which liability insurance prevails most
widely is the field of automobile accidents, where the plaintiff's own
contributory negligence is most frequently invoked by the defendant. Most of us would probably concede that it is the strong human
urge to avoid becoming involved in any accident (irrespective of
whose behavior may be responsible) that prompts us to behave with
caution.
It has been frequently observed that triers of tort suits
(whether judges or jurors) are influenced in their decisions less by
an appreciation as to who was at fault than by a growing conviction
that the cost of accidents should be distributed in dilution
throughout society. This passing the loss along so that large
numbers of persons will each shoulder just a bit of the cost of a
given accident is an objective which can be achieved either through
making available an access to a pool of insurance premiums collected
from all who engage in the same activity, or, in the case of industry,
through a treatment of anticipated accident cost as an item of the
expense of conducting business. This item, in turn, can be recouped
by the enterpriser who increases the price of his goods or the
charge for his services. The violent shift in the raison d'6tre of tort
liability away from the notion of an ethical penalty and toward the
best economic risk bearer is so pronounced that the Louisiana
courts are openly betraying an inclination to abandon the requirement that "blame" must be established and are showing themselves
receptive to novel doctrines, such as liability for "defects" (even
though non-negligently caused) and unqualified liability for the acts
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of "things." In this climate of the jurisprudence any suggestion that
the amount of recovery should be determined by exploring the
relative degree of the blameworthiness of the parties has an
anomalous ring. How is a plaintiff's negligence to be "compared"
with the concededly blameless behavior of the defendant? Under
this state of affairs a resort to comparative negligence looks
suspiciously like an effort to groom a dead horse.

L 'Allegro
The foregoing observations can be dismissed as largely irrelevant. Even if it is conceded that the notion of fault retains little integrity in modern tort litigation, this affords a poor argument
against a preference of comparative negligence over traditional contributory negligence. However chimerical may be the notion of fault,
it still serves as the most universally employed term in the torts
vocabulary. And if comparative fault is unacceptable, contributory
fault is surely no less so. So long as fault serves as the touchstone of
liability, its taint should affect equally the rights of plaintiffs and
defendants. Hence comparative negligence still holds the clear advantage. Even conceding that it is difficult to compare one piece of
misconduct with another, this affords no reason to throw the baby
out with the bath water. The admission that it is difficult to weigh
one fault against another suggests at most that a pro rata apportionment might be preferable.
II Penseroso
This rejoinder is persuasive only after one has first subscribed
to the point of view that the doctrine of contributory negligence is
punitive-that it rests on the notion that the undeserving victim has
brought the loss of his claim upon himself in part at least, through
his own misbehavior, and he has thus shown that he is unworthy of
the protection which law otherwise would have afforded him. That is
to say, where both of the litigants are blameworthy, the law should
play hands off. But this idea, despite its popular acceptance, is one
which should be cautiously examined. And this, I believe, is what
Professor Johnson undertakes to do in his contribution to this symposium. He points out that the "retribution" or "punishment" thesis
described above rests on a preliminary assumption that the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty which concededly he breached
and for which he normally would be answerable. But despite this
breach of duty, the "retribution" argument continues, the defendant
must be allowed to escape liability in order to assure that the plaintiff is appropriately penalized for his misbehavior. Once it is assum-
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ed that the proper objective is to prevent the guilty plaintiff from
profiting by his own wrong, the argument in favor of comparative
negligence must be recognized as convincing, for the penalty should
not exceed the relative gravity of the plaintiff's offense, and a comparison of the wrongdoing of each party becomes the fairest play.
On the other hand, if the "retribution" thesis is not supportable
or is inadequate, an entirely fresh examination of comparative
negligence becomes appropriate. In many instances, the plaintiff's
own behavior must be regarded as conduct which, wrongful or not,
nevertheless serves to create an extravagant risk beyond the reach
of any duty that can be properly imposed on the defendant. That is
to say, the careless plaintiff's claim is frequently denied, not in
order to teach him a lesson, but in order to avoid an injustice to the
defendant. It should be noted as equally important that the converse
may also hold true: The prospect that someone such as the plaintiff
might prove to be incautious may serve as the specific reason why
the defendant is burdened by law with the particular duty whose
breach is chargeable against him. In either event, the proper fit, or
the misfit, between duty and risk is not a matter that can be solved
felicitously by merely making an adjustment in terms of dollars and
cents. Either the defendant should be charged for the full loss, or he
should not be answerable at all. We must face the question as to
whether duty-risk and comparative negligence can be so adjusted as
to co-exist in harmony, or whether, on the other hand, the conflict
between them will result in utter confusion and even a loss of bearings for the continued development of Louisiana torts law. This appears to be the source of Professor Johnson's concern, and his argument indeed deserves sober study.
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